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Abstract 
This paper studies the importance of the dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy. The paper is 
organized as follows: in the first part the concept of dynamic inconsistency is explained; the next 
sections analyse the the rules versus discretion dilemma and some solutions to counteract the 
dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy - delegate monetary policy to an independent and 
conservative central banker; offering to the central banker a performance contract, in which his salary 
is directly linked to the performance of some important macroeconomic variables such as GDP and 
inflation rate; inflation targeting strategy. The last section briefly presents the management of 
monetary policy in Romania after adoption of inflation targeting strategy. 
Keywords:  dynamic inconsistency, rules, discretion, monetary policy management, inflation 
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Introduction 
Dynamic inconsistency arises because monetary policy makers choose to pursue 
short term goals leading to missing the long-term goals. Expansionary monetary 
policy will lead, in the short term, at a faster economic growth and reduce 
unemployment and those who choose the monetary policy coordinates will be 
tempted to adopt this path, although on the long-term positive results are offset by 
prices and salaries increases in the private sector, caused by a relexed monetary 
policy. Thus, in the long-term inflation will increase, its negative effects altering the 
economic situation. McCallum (1995) shows that central banks are able to discern 
long-term negative effects of those temporary positive in short-term and avoid them, 
as long as they are independent. In most cases, dynamic inconsistency is caused by 
political pressures on monetary policy makers. 
Dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy is ex-post deviation from the ex ante 
formulated plans, when these plans would have been implemented. Reasons 
stemming from the existence of dynamic inconsistency in monetary policy refers to: 
monetary authority wishes (or pressures from the government in this regard) to 
increase employment levels or, in a more general perspective, the level of economic 
activity (generally substantiated by the existence of distortions in the input market - 
for example, distortionary taxation of labor or the existence of transfer programs – 
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leading to suboptimal levels in terms of employment or economic activity itself), 
eroding the real value of public debt, if you generate inflationary surprises, 
inflationary consequences of devaluations undertaken to improve the current 
account situation (Cukierman,1986).  
An effective way to reduce the time-inconsistency problem is to give central banks 
the primary goal of maintaining price stability and ensuring the independence of the 
central bank to achieve the target without government interference. Such an 
institutional commitment to price stability can enhance the credibility of monetary 
policy and improve its performance. 
 
Rules versus discretion in monetary policy  
Most economists, including Mishkin, characterize inflation targeting as a monetary 
policy framework that can be called "limited dicreţionism" which combines the 
advantages attributed to the traditional rules with discretionary policy. Thus, they 
reject the idea of a dichotomy rules - discretionary policy. 
Another way to address the issue is to highlight differences between economic 
behaviors determined by applying rules or discretionary policies, assuming that no 
central bank does apply a simple formula or does describe an optimal control for 
monetary policy instruments. In 1993, Taylor showed that a rule-based behavior is 
systematically (in the methodically sense, following a plan and not by chance or by 
circumstance). McCallum does not consider the statement sufficient, because a 
central bank can act systematically (always answering the same type of problems 
with the same type of measures), remaining discretionary in the analytical sense. 
The constrained discretionism notion - which leaves to central bank the freedom to 
dispose of instruments, but not that linked to goals that must be achieved – combines 
discretionary policy of central bank with monetary policy rules. Practically, central 
bank must choose that configuration of policy instruments which leads to maximize 
the likelihood of achieving the target, which gives monetary policy a strong pro-
active caracter.  
The conclusion of most debates - whether monetary policy should be discretionary 
or should follow a rule - is that economic policies should be consistent in time to be 
credible to private agents.  
Monetary policy credibility problem occurs when those who set the monetary policy 
wants to achieve an optimal monetary policy rule or a plan for future policy at a time 
t, chosen arbitrarily. Monetary authority will have to maximize a function under 
certain constraints derived from the need to ensure the balance of private sector. 
When they select the best policy for a time t+s in the future the policy maker must 
take account of how the policy for the period t+s will affect the behavior of private 
economic agents from time t to time t+s. When it comes to t+s arises the following 
problem: the trajectory of monetary policy determined at time t will be longer 
optimal? A policy is time consistent if the action planned at time t for time t+s 
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remains optimal when it comes to be implemented effectively at time t+s. Usually, 
according to expert studies of monetary policy, it will no longer be optimal. Since 
consumer decisions taken between times t and t+s have been already adopted, 
monetary policy can no longer influence them. Monetary policy maker faces 
problems, others than those which were valid at time t and this will make him prefer 
a different policy. In this case original choice that he did will be dynamically 
inconsistent.  
An optimal monetary policy strategy at time t is dynamically inconsistent if at time 
t+s, when should be adopted it is no longer optimal. In general, there must be some 
externalities and should not be a sufficient number of tools to control them 
(condition which usually occurs in most economies) for that dynamic inconsistency 
phenomenon to appear.  
If monetary policy decision-maker is obliged to respect for the period t+s the 
conduct determined at time t, because cost of monetary policy change is too large, 
dynamic inconsistency problem becomes irrelevant. 
In reality, monetary policy is conducted in a discretionary environment in which 
decisions are taken sequentially and review of the decisions taken by policy makers 
is a common practice. In this case, private agents will anticipate future incentive of 
monetary policy makers to abandon the plan proved to be optimal ex ante and would 
expect instead to be implemented an ex post optimal policy. 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) show that, in a discretionary environment, in which 
policy makers will choose to follow the strategy taking into account only the present 
situation, this will not normally result in maximizing the social function. 
Starting from the benefits it might produce unexpected inflation by increasing output 
and hence, reduce unemployment below the natural rate and also increase 
government revenue by nominal depreciation of government debt, which would 
have the same effect as levying a new tax income, Barro and Gordon (1983) show 
that a rule-based monetary policy leads to lower costs than a discretionary policy. In 
case of using monetary policy rules, the bank will choose the level of inflation 
which coincides with expected inflation. 
As a result, leading to lower costs associated with inflation, the use of monetary 
policy rules lead to better results than discretionary policy, which coincides with 
conclusions reached by Kydland and Prescott. 
The existence of inflation bias in case of discretionary policy occurs for two reasons: 
first is the fact that the central bank is stimulated to produce inflation more than the 
expected inflation when agents' expectations are set and the second reason is that the 
central bank can not commit to obtain a zero rate of inflation . 
Explanation is that monetary policy maker can not be credible regarding the policy 
of zero rate of inflation. Thus, even if he announces that inflation rate will be zero 
and the decisions of private agents will be based on the assumption that inflation 
will actually be zero, is in his interest to induce a rise in price level. Gain from 
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increased output by fooling economic agents sufficiently offset the costs of higher 
inflation, which implies lack of credibility of the policy promoted without a firm 
commitment from the monetary policy maker. Therefore, the implemented policy is 
dynamically inconsistent. 
The problem becomes seriously if the governors have short-term objectives and can 
influence central bank policy. Reality has shown that high degree of central banks 
independence make a commitment to low inflation to be more credible. However, 
independence is not sufficient because the policy maker may wish to obtain an 
output level above the potential level (sustainable, non-inflationary). Therefore, 
another prerequisite is the commitment of monetary policy to promote an increase in 
output similar to the potential. 
 
Solutions to counteract the dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy 
A first category of proposed solutions to counter by motivational way the dynamic 
inconsistency of monetary policy  and reducing the inflation bias, refers to the 
delegation of monetary policy formulation and implementation to a "conservative" 
central banker, defined as an inflation-averse individual, aversion higher than the 
social ones (Rogoff, 1985). This delegation does not eliminate the dynamic 
inconsistency problem, but reduces the inflation bias. An interesting question is how 
central bankers react to supply shocks. Rogoff argues that the existence of an 
excessive aversion to inflation is considered to be suboptimal in terms of 
maintaining the flexibility needed to stabilize real output. In addition, targets mainly 
play the role of mechanisms for monetary policy discipline, being rarely optimal 
achieving them accurately. 
There appears a compromise: having a conservative central banker there are benefits 
due to a low inflation, but at a cost - distorted reaction to shocks. To large shocks on 
the supply side, the public would prefer a higher inflation than that obtained by the 
conservative central banker. Rogoff shows that, given this compromise, there is an 
optimal degree of central bank conservatism.  
Some economists (Walsh, 1995, Persson and Tabellini, 1993) have proposed another 
solution to the problem of dynamic inconsistency: this consist in offering the central 
banker a performance contract, in which his salary is directly linked to the 
performance of some important macroeconomic variables such as GDP and inflation 
rate. Thus, Walsh (1995) suggests that, rather than worry about the search for a 
conservative central banker, the society should stimulate monetary authority through 
a performance contract, so when it pursues its own interests, simultaneously 
maximizes the welfare of the society.  
The advantage of such a contract is that its implementation is independent of 
informational asymmetry (private information available to the central bank becomes 
irrelevant) and also of the effort made by policy makers to implement monetary 
policy, monitoring performance in relation to contractual obligations (ie the inflation 
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target) being made only in relation to monetary variables publicly observable (Popa, 
2000). 
Another important advantage of the penalty formulation dependent of changes in 
inflation rate is the central bank’s motivation in setting realistic targets, taking into 
account both the correlation of the cost attached to failure to achieve the target with 
the size of ex-post deviation from it and that benefit of generating unanticipated 
inflation drops to higher rates of targeted inflation. Thus, the monetary authority 
behavior in relation to economic agents should be seen rather as a principal – agent 
problem. The agent (monetary authority) has, however, a set of preferences that do 
not yield the outcome preferred by the society (principal). In this case, there is at 
least one disadvantage: the contract is signed by the central bank and private agents, 
but in reality such a contract can only be conceivable between a political body and 
the central bank. The question that remains is what political body should bear 
responsibility for signing the contract. If government should be the principal, we 
have principal-agent problem of second order, because the government is, from this 
point of view an agent of the public (the contracts with our governments don’t 
perform well). 
McCallum (1995) argues that if government is the principal, then the performance 
contract approach does not solve the dynamic inconsistency. If the contract is put 
into effect, then the government must sanction the central bank in periods of high 
inflation, but has an incentive not to do it - because imposing a sanction on the 
central bank, when inflation is already high, will not reduce the dynamic 
inconsistency, will not increase the social welfare, having only a preventive role. 
One solution to avoid the problem of dynamic inconsistency and the most common 
is the inflation targeting strategy,  because monetary authorities are forced to 
mantain unchanged behavior, individuals being able to observe at any time if the 
central bank can not achieve the inflation target, or if there is a tendency of failing 
measures initially adopted. 
Another advantage of this strategy is that inflation targeting allows monetary policy 
respond to domestic shocks in the economy, because the monetary authority does 
not depend on one variable that can not control, but can use all available information 
to develop and use appropriate measures to combat shocks occurring in the national 
economy, unlike other solutions and strategies (conservative central banker, 
exchange rate or monetary aggregate targeting). 
Although inflation targeting is not a rigid rule, because the central bank can use all 
available information to determine the optimal policy and must not focus on one 
variable, however, changing inflation targets can create order reputational damage, 
which decreases the credibility of monetary authorities, in the future resulting in 
failure to combat inflation. Thus, inflation targeting combines the advantages 
conferred by the rules with those of discretionary policy, this monetary policy 
regime combining the constraint imposed by the target with a margin of flexibility in 
the instruments used by the monetary authority. 
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The management of  monetary policy in Romania 
Pursuant to its statute, the primary objective of the National Bank of Romania is to 
ensure and maintain price stability. Since august 2005, monetary policy is 
implemented in the context of inflation targeting strategy, which coexist with the 
exchange rate regime of the leu (a managed float). This exchange rate regime is 
consistent with the use of inflation targets as a nominal anchor of monetary policy 
and allows a flexible response of this policy to unexpected shocks that may affect 
the economy. 
During 2005-september 2008 the main instrument of monetary policy was attracting 
deposits, the  fixed interest rate attached to these investments being the monetary 
policy rate. NBR has made successive changes in the characteristics of this 
instrument, thus aiming to increase the management effectiveness by the central 
bank of money market liquidity conditions and hence the influence of monetary 
policy instruments on short-term interest rates in this market. A major change 
produced in the operational framework of monetary policy occurred in the last 
quarter of 2008, given the further reducing of the structural excess liquidity, net 
liquidity of banks has become negative. In these circumstances, for the first time in 
the past decade, NBR returned to the position of the banking system creditor. 
 
                         Source: National Bank of Romania 
Fig 1. Widening Spread between Interbank Rates and Policy Rate 
 
During 2005-2007 there were periods when inflation expectations coexisted with a 
markedly stronger domestic currency. Under the circumstances, the central bank was 
faced with a serious dilemma in terms of the newly-adopted monetary policy 
regime. Policy rate hikes, required for bringing expectations in line with the inflation 
target, attracted further foreign capital, which entailed the appreciation of the leu. 
The constraint deriving from the large capital inflows was severe enough for the 
NBR to opt for maintaining a managed float regime of the domestic currency. This 
led to criticism by some analysts who claimed that the inflation targeting strategy 
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adopted in 2005 involved the free float of the domestic currency in order to avoid 
potentially conflicting targets. 
The central bank’s policy on forex market intervention was further steered in this 
new environment by the philosophy that a high volatility of the exchange rate is 
detrimental to the inflation target as well as to the financial soundness of the real and 
financial sectors. A small emerging economy with a significant openness is exposed 
on an ongoing basis to the threat of capital movements likely to adversely affect the 
stability of the financial market, the foreign exchange market in particular. 
The NBR’s interventions in the foreign exchange market were meant to avoid an 
excessive weakening of the domestic currency, while also linking the level and the 
pace of the depreciation to the progress in the current account adjustment. With this 
goal in mind, the central bank monitored the developments in the real effective 
exchange rate of the domestic currency, along with the pressures on external 
competitiveness stemming from wage bargaining. 
The magnitude and the timing of forex market interventions were also related to 
money market liquidity management, given that public deficit was financed, over 
certain periods, by resorting chiefly to the funds released under the arrangement 
signed with the EU, the IMF and other international financial institutions. The NBR 
provided banks with liquidity by way of open-market operations, while in the prior 
years, amid excess liquidity due to massive capital inflows, the central bank held the 
position of a net debtor position vis-à-vis the banking system. The rationale behind 
the forex market intervention in the above-mentioned context was the attempt to 
fend off temporary reversals in the NBR’s creditor position vis-à-vis the banking 
system, which could have jeopardised the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
                         lei billion, stock, daily averages 
 
                         Source: National Bank of Romania 
Fig 2. Liquidity-providing operations 
Therefore, it may be asserted that foreign exchange market interventions proved 
useful not only in keeping the exchange rate within a range consistent with 
macroeconomic fundamentals, but also in ensuring optimal money market liquidity 
management.  
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Annual inflation targets (are determined by the central bank with the government on 
a time horizon of two years) were placed in recent years on a downward path, their 
levels falling from 7.5 percent ± 1 percentage point in 2005 to 3.5 percent ± 1 
percentage point in 2009 and 2010. Inflation target for the end of 2011 was lowered 
to the level of 3 percent ± 1 percentage point. 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Romania  
Fig 3. Inflation Forecast 
 
 
The option to increase for 2011 the downward trend of annual inflation targets was 
justified mainly by the perspective of a sustained deceleration of inflation in coming 
years, considering the severe contraction suffered by the Romanian economy in 
2009 under the impact of the global financial and economic crisis and the slow 
recovery, anticipated in the post-crisis period, of global and national economy. At 
the same time, the option regarding the inflation target for 2011 reflected the central 
bank's concern to establish realistic goals, achieving them being essential for 
strengthening the central bank credibility and anchoring inflation expectations over 
the medium term. 
Strengthening disinflation in the rhythm imposed by achieving annual inflation 
targets remains a challenge for monetary policy. In 2009, one of the challenges 
resulted from the need to ensure an orderly adjustment of severe macroeconomic 
imbalances previously accumulated and also the imperative of maintaining financial 
stability, in the context of global financial and economic crisis. 
Central bank opted for a gradual adjustment of real monetary conditions broadly, 
intended to maintain the cautious nature of monetary policy. Thus, the reduction 
from 10.25 percent to 8 percent of interest rate monetary policy operated by the 
central bank during 2009 (within February-September) was done in five steps. By its 
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decisions, the monetary authority has sought to ensure convergence of inflation to 
the medium-term objectives and creating the conditions for sustainable revitalization 
of the loan process of the Romanian economy; reducing the required reserve ratios 
also joined the gradual alignment process of their level to the ECB standards. 
 
 
          Source: National Bank of Romania  
Fig 4. Inflation Rate and Interest Rates 
 
The stabilization of the domestic political environment and reactivation of 
multilateral external financing arrangement signed with the EU, IMF and other 
international financial institutions, likely to reduce the risks related to the economic 
policy mix implemented by the authorities and thus to improve the perception of 
external environment on the Romanian economy, allowed central bank to reduce 
monetary policy rate. Thus, within January-March 2010, the central bank made three 
successive reductions of the monetary policy rate - by 0.50 percentage points each - 
being lowered at the level of 6.5 percent.   
Inflation targeting in Romania was less orthodox, soft type, for several reasons: 
monetary duality of the economy - with large euroisation, high interest differential, 
premature liberalization of capital account and under conditions of imperfect 
markets (of a monetary transmission mechanism immature), NBR was unable to 
disregard the exchange rate dynamics. Interest rates were sometimes very low in the 
money market with the desire to discourage speculative capital, while the central 
goal was to get disinflation, so to not leave excess liquidity in the market. We have a 
relatively small economy at the scale of Europe and excessive currency fluctuations 
may not only cause financial instability. In terms of the dilemmas that may have a 
central bank, we had to reconcile disinflation with the need to discourage 
speculative high capital inputs, markets imperfections allowing a central bank 
practice ”less clean”. We practice inflation targeting in a hybrid formula which 
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allows some flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy (Dăianu, 2008). This is 
strengthened by a previous study (Balaban and Vîntu, 2010) in which we estimated 
the Phillips curve for Romania. The results of econometric tests indicate a 
significant estimated coefficient of the output gap for Romania, which support the 
assumption of a nonlinear Phillips curve. This suggests that the National Bank of 
Romania's monetary policy strategy should aim a flexible inflation targeting. 
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